Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Australian Digital Forensics Conference

Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events

3-12-2007

Can SDV technology be uUtilised in a smartphone to prevent
forensic analysis?
Peter James
Secure Systems Limited

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
DOI: 10.4225/75/57ad64ac7ff37
5th Australian Digital Forensics Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, December 3rd 2007.
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/adf/18

Can SDV Technology be Utilised in a Smartphone to Prevent Forensic Analysis?
Peter James 1
Secure Systems
pjames@securesystems.com.au

Abstract
Eliminating the opportunities to successfully acquire data from mobile devices is a critical security objective for
certain organisations. In particular, Government agencies require assurance that classified data is secured
against hostile forensic analysis. The Secure Systems Silicon Data Vault (SDV) is a hardware based data
encryption and access control device that has been accredited by the Australian Government to secure classified
information held on laptops and portable hard disk drives; hardware is recognised as a superior trusted
platform to implement security mechanisms. The SDV’s 128bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
cryptography, sophisticated key management & access controls and total disk encryption makes the SDV an
extremely difficult device from which to acquire data and perform forensic analysis.
With the increasing functionality and storage capabilities of Smartphones strong security mechanisms are
required by organisations that may hold sensitive data on these devices. Software based security applications
exist for Smartphones that provide good security and severely impact the acquisition of data suitable for
forensic analysis. If strong hardware based security can be integrated into a Smartphone, forensic analysis
could be further constrained. This paper considers the feasibility of implementing the SDV technology into a
Palm Treo. An overview of the SDV is given and six security design principles are enumerated. Implementation
of the six design principles ensure the SDV provides strong security. The Treo architecture is reviewed and the
concept of operation enumerated. The challenges with respect to implementing a Smartphone SDV that is
conformant with the security design principles are discussed. Possible Smartphone SDV conceptual designs are
presented. The concept of operation, implementation issues and conformance of each conceptual design to the
SDV security design principles are discussed.

Keywords
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forensics.

Introduction
The Secure Systems Silicon Data Vault (SDV) (Armstrong et al 2004, SDVTech 2006) is an award winning
(iAward 2006, SoAITI 2005) hardware based data protection solution for mobile applications. The SDV
provides protection for data at rest when the data is stored on Integrated Drive Electronics (IDE) Parallel
Advanced Technology Attachment (PATA) and IDE Serial ATA (SATA) hard disk drives (HDD). The SDV
technology has been implemented into a range of laptop and portable HDDs to provide amongst the strongest
commercially available protection for data at rest. The SDV product range has been accredited by the Australian
Government to protect classified information. A number of Secure Systems customers have asked if SDV
technology could be implemented into Smartphones to provide strong security.
A Smartphone is essentially the merging of mobile phone and Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) technology into
the one fully featured product. Typically, a Smartphone provides more features and functions than a standard
mobile, for example Smartphones usually have a qwerty keyboard and a push email capability. Smartphones
started to emerge in the late 1990s and have now become a key business communication tool for managers,
executives and mobile workers. Smartphones use sophisticated operating systems to provide memory
management, device control, application management & scheduling and data storage. There are five operating
systems that dominate the Smartphone market; Symbian, Windows Mobile, Linux, Blackberry and PalmOS.
There is little or no compatibility between the five operating systems and therefore consolidation is likely in the
future.
Palm Inc (Palm 2007), traditionally a vendor of PDAs, produces a range of Smartphones branded the Treo
range. Early models of the Treo range came with the PalmOS operating system; however more recent models
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now support the Windows Mobile operating system as an alternative to PalmOS. The particular Treo model
considered in this paper is the Treo 650. The Treo 650 supports only a basic password protection mechanism as
standard security. Numerous software security applications exist to provide stronger protection of data stored on
the Treo; good examples include Pointsec Mobile (Pointsec 2007) and Teallock (Teallock 2007), both
applications provide stronger authentication based access controls and encryption of data stored in internal and
external flash memory.
With no standard Smartphone hardware architecture or dominant Smartphone operating system, designing a
Smartphone SDV is a challenging proposition; the existing SDV design was able to rely upon established PC
and HDD technology standards. Integrating SDV technology directly into a Smartphone’s circuitry is
considered infeasible (due to the close alliance required with a Smartphone manufacturer like Palm Inc) and it
has therefore been assumed that a Smartphone SDV would be an attachable device using an industry standard
interface. A high level review performed by Secure Systems (Geddes 2004) on the possible integration of SDV
technology into PDAs proposed using the Secure Digital (SD) card interface on a PDA to connect/insert a
device containing SDV functionality. A number of Smartphones including the Palm Treo range have an SD
card slot. This paper builds upon the idea of using the SD card interface by proposing a conceptual design for a
Smartphone SDV device using the Secure Digital Input Output (SDIO) card.
An SDIO card (SDIO 2007) has the same mechanical, electrical, power and signalling attributes of an SD card;
an SDIO device can be inserted into an SD card slot and if the host device supports SDIO devices the SDIO
device can be operated. Devices that support SDIO cards usually provide the single slot for both SD cards and
SDIO cards. The SDIO card provides high-speed data I/O with low power consumption for mobile electronic
devices. An SDIO device is able to interrupt the host (e.g. a Smartphone) when the SDIO device is inserted into
an SD/SDIO card slot. While an SD card is a storage device, an SDIO card allows hardware accessories to be
developed; examples include Wi-Fi and Bluetooth adapters, GPS receivers, TV tuners, cameras, RFID readers
and fingerprint readers. The SDIO standard provides a suitable interface to enable an external SDV device to be
attached to a Smartphone. The Palm Treo range supports SD cards and SDIO cards/devices.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE SDV (LAPTOP SDV)
The Laptop SDV is the core SDV unit that all other SDV models utilise; it also provides the most appropriate
model to use for analysis in this paper. Only the attributes and features of the Laptop SDV necessary to support
the discussion on the feasibility of a Smartphone SDV are presented.
Overview of Design
The Laptop SDV (SDVTech 2006) is an alternative secure HDD for a laptop PC; it has the same form factor as
a laptop 2.5” HDD. The Laptop SDV replaces the HDD in a laptop; it is connected to the host motherboards
IDE controller. Figure 1 below presents a pictorial image of the Laptop SDV.

Figure 1 – Picture of Laptop SDV
The implementation of security mechanisms in hardware coupled with total independence of security
mechanisms from the laptop’s operating system ensures that successful direct attacks and/or exploitation of
operating system vulnerabilities are extremely difficult. The primary objective of the SDV is to provide strong
security for data at rest 2 . The SDV is a cryptographic hardware device (James et al 2004) that asserts total
control over a HDD at system start-up and enforces correct user authentication before data on the HDD is
accessible. Once successful authentication has been achieved the SDV allows the laptop’s operating system to
be loaded. The SDV supports differentiated access rights, i.e. user profiles can be defined with permissions to
access different parts of the HDD. The SDV operates independently of the host computer’s resources, providing
2
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real time encryption and decryption of all data transferred to and from the integral HDD; ensuring the data
stored on the hard disk drive is cryptographically secured at rest, even if the SDV is physically removed from
the laptop. A conceptual model of a Laptop SDV topology is given in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2 – Conceptual Model of Laptop SDV Topology
Concept of Operation
At system power-up, a Laptop without an SDV installed will identify the storage devices available and load a
Master Boot Record (MBR) from the main boot device; usually the primary HDD. The boot device in turn
loads the operating system present on the storage device. While the operating system is running, the user
typically has unrestricted access to all sections of the storage media. Conversely a laptop with an SDV inside
operates as follows:
•

At system power-up the laptop loads the Master Boot Record from the SDV. This in turn loads an
Authentication Application (AA) stored in the SDV. While the AA is running, the user has no access to
the SDV’s integral HDD.

•

The user is prompted to authenticate.

•

The AA passes the information entered by the user to the SDV for authentication processing. Should
the authentication process fail, the AA will prompt the user to re-authenticate. If the user fails to
authenticate after a pre-defined number of attempts, the computer must be powered down and restarted
to continue the user pre-boot authentication process.

•

Once the user has successfully authenticated, the SDV decrypts the access keys and associated access
rights stored in the authenticated user’s profile. This information is used by the SDV to ensure
protected hard disk data is accessed according to the profile for each user. The system continues the
boot process and loads the OS from the SDV hard disk drive.

•

The SDV continues to operate independently of the host computer’s resources, providing real time
encryption and decryption of all data transferred to and from the SDV integral hard disk storage device
until the computer is shut down.

SDV Security Design Principles
To be considered a valid implementation of SDV technology any Smartphone SDV design would need to
encompass the design characteristics that deliver strong security and hence reduce the ability to acquire data.
Conformance to the following SDV security design principles will ensure opportunities to use forensic analysis
techniques on acquired data are significantly reduced:
1.

Pre-boot authentication: Performing authentication before the operating system has loaded ensures no
hostile software or operating system vulnerabilities can be exploited to obtain authentication
credentials.

2.

Full disk encryption: With no data in plain text the opportunities to gain a ‘starting point’ to break the
encryption are eliminated.

3.

Sector level encryption: Encrypting at the lowest level of formatted storage reduces the possibility that
pattern matching can be performed to break the encryption.

4.

Control of data channel: Physically positioning the SDV between the PC motherboard and HDD
ensures all writes are encrypted. Also access control to parts of the HDD can be enforced.

5.

Totally independent of PC Operating System: The SDV behaves like a standard HDD and resides
beneath the operating system so no attacks or vulnerabilities can be exploited.

6.

Security functionality implemented in hardware:
difficult.

Exploiting and attacking hardware is extremely

These six SDV security design principles will be used in this paper as criteria to assess if the proposed
Smartphone SDV conceptual design can provide the same level of security as the security provided by the
Laptop and Portable SDVs.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PALM TREO 650 & PALMOS
A Palm product, and the Treo 650 in particular, was selected as the host for a (proposed) Smartphone SDV
design due primarily to the information available, from both Palm Inc and the Internet. As with any (closed)
proprietary product range, Palm does not publish extensive technical information. However, sufficient
information was able to be sourced from a combination of Palm developer documentation (PalmDev Guide
2007) and developer & hacker web sites (Treo Web Sites 2007) that have appeared over the past few years
dedicated to the Treo range.
This overview focuses on developing an understanding of the appropriate areas of the Treo 650 hardware and
software architecture necessary to determine if SDV technology could be integrated into a Smartphone. In
particular, the Treo storage architecture and memory management are outlined together with the PalmOS
operating system capabilities.
Overview of the Treo 650 Storage and Memory Management
The Treo, by Palm, is a family of compact Smartphones that integrates a mobile phone, wireless data
applications such as messaging and web browsing, and an organiser. The Treo 650 (Treo 650, 2007) has been
available since late 2004 and is managed and controlled by version 5.4.8 of the PalmOS operating system.
Figure 3 below presents a pictorial image of the Palm Treo 650.

Figure 3 – Picture of Palm Treo 650 3
The Treo 650 does not have an internal HDD. Prior to the 650, the Treo stored all application and data in
volatile memory with the PalmOS operating system loaded from masked Read Only Memory (ROM); as a
consequence power had to be supplied to the Treo all the time, if power was lost all the data and applications
were lost. The Treo 650 has both non-volatile memory for storage of PalmOS, applications and data, and
volatile memory for execution of PalmOS and applications. Two other storage devices are available on the Treo
650:
•

Up to 2GB of non-volatile memory on an SD card.

•

Variable size non-volatile memory available on the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card.

The Treo 650 has 32MB of non-volatile NAND flash memory (sometimes referred to as a DiskOnAChip) which
is structured into two partitions. The first partition contains a boot loader and the compressed PalmOS operating
system, known as the ‘ROM’ or ‘compressed ROM’, and occupies approximately 9MB. The second partition is
available storage space for applications and data. The second partition is approximately 23MB and is structured
into a 512 byte sector file system - the PalmOS Non-Volatile File System (NVFS). Figure 4 presents a memory
map of the non-volatile memory.
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Figure 4 – Non-volatile NAND Flash Memory Map
The Treo 650 has 32MB of volatile SDRAM which is structured into three parts. Approximately 16MB of
SDRAM is allocated to the executing PalmOS image, known as the decompressed ROM. A further 5MB is
allocated for the PalmOS and application dynamic heap and temporary space. The remaining memory is used
for the executing applications and data, known as the DBCache. The PalmOS image is protected from
corruption from other executing applications by setting the area of SDRAM to Read-Only. Figure 5 presents a
memory map of the volatile SDRAM memory.

Figure 5 – Volatile SDRAM Memory Map
The Treo 650 will be automatically placed into sleep mode after a defined period to conserve power. Upon
receiving a sleep notification PalmOS writes any changes to the applications/data partition. This does not,
however, mean that the contents of the SDRAM are removed or PalmOS is stopped. Only a loss of power
(depleted battery) or a soft or warm reset causes the SDRAM to be cleaned and a fresh reload of the PalmOS
image (from the compressed ROM partition on the non-volatile NAND memory) to occur. A hard reset results
in clearing of both the SDRAM and the NVFS partition of the non-volatile NAND memory.
An SD/SDIO card memory has any file system on the card mounted before data can be accessed. The Treo 650
officially supports SD/SDIO cards with up to 2GB of memory. Once the SD/SDIO file system is mounted,
applications (and data) on the SD/SDIO card can be loaded into the DBCache and executed 4 . The SIM card
memory is accessible and available for storage via certain applications (e.g. SIMBook). SIM memory can vary
in size; typically the size of a SIM card’s memory is 64KB. It is assumed that an application reading or writing
to the SIM card memory would process the data in the Treo’s SDRAM.
Protecting data on any SIM card memory has been deemed beyond the scope of this paper.
Overview of PalmOS – File Systems, DBCache Management & SDIO Slot Management
The Treo 650 comes loaded with PalmOS version 5.4.8; this is a sophisticated operating system providing
comprehensive memory, device and file system management in addition to graphical input and output. An
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overview is given of the PalmOS file systems, SDRAM management and SDIO slot management capabilities, as
these capabilities are relevant to supporting a Smartphone SDV design.
PalmOS 5.4.8 supports two file systems; NVFS for managing information stored in the non-volatile NVFS
partition and Virtual File System (VFS) for managing information stored on SD/SDIO cards. SIM card memory
is managed by applications that directly read and write to it and is not considered in this paper.
NVFS: PalmOS formats the NVFS partition into 512 byte sectors. When an application is invoked it is loaded
into the DBCache in the SDRAM together with any data to be processed. Depending upon the application, as
data is updated it is written back to the NVFS partition. Also certain PalmOS events (e.g. Treo going into sleep
mode) will cause the DBCache to update the NVFS partition to ensure data is not lost. To ensure all available
memory is utilised and avoid fragmentation in the NVFS partition, PalmOS will look for available space in
NVFS sectors and allocate data to a sector from more than one DBCache record (essentially PalmOS
terminology for a file) or downloaded application.
VFS: VFS is a unified interface that allows PalmOS to access different file systems on different media types,
e.g. VFS allows a FAT 12 or FAT 16 file system on an SD card to be accessed using the same
method/procedure call. There appears to be no relationship between VFS and NVFS. It is assumed that an
application and data held on an SD/SDIO card is loaded into the SDRAM and that PalmOS performs updates to
the SD/SDIO card as required in a similar way in which records are written from DBCache to the NVFS
partition.
DBCache Management: As the DBCache is only 10MB the PalmOS cache manager has to manage this section
of SDRAM efficiently to ensure an application can execute when invoked. Therefore PalmOS will write data
back to its source location (NVFS partition or SD/SDIO card) upon an applications instruction or when space is
required (typically once the DBCache exceeds 9MB). When application’s start, stop, or use memory,
fragmentation can occur so the cache manager continuously moves data into contiguous blocks to maximise
available SDRAM.
SDIO Slot Management: PalmOS has a set of libraries to enable an application or PalmOS to control and
read/write to an SDIO card. The PalmOS Expansion Manager detects insertion and removal of the SDIO card
and mounts/unmounts any file systems. VFS manager provides the unified file system management. Both the
expansion and VFS managers interface to the SDIO card through the SDIO Slot driver which manages power,
interrupts, notification of events and essentially all other functionality specified in the SDIO Card Specification
(SDIO 2007). Figure 6 presents a conceptual model of the interactions between the libraries and an application.

Figure 6 – Model of PalmOS libraries required to support SDIO card
An SDIO card/device can exist as a single function device or as device and storage combination. An SDIO
device has its data and executable code located in the SDIO Code Storage area (CSA). The CSA is accessible as
a mounted file system through the VFS manager. Once mounted, code in the CSA can be downloaded and
‘autorun’ in the Treo.
Concept of Operation
Upon power being supplied for the first time or subsequent to a hard reset the following occurs:
1.

The NVFS partition and SDRAM will be empty.

2.

The Initial Program Loader (IPL) executes from the non-volatile memory. Whilst the IPL is located in
the non-volatile block addressable NAND flash memory, a very small part of the memory allows the

IPL to execute in place. The IPL performs some initialisation of the Treo 650 processor and hardware
then the IPL loads the Secondary Program Loader (SPL) from non-volatile memory into the Treo’s
SDRAM.
3.

Once loaded control is passed to the SPL, which initialises Treo devices (e.g. LCD and keyboard) and
loads the Tertiary Program Loader (TPL) from non-volatile memory into SDRAM, passing control to
the TPL once loaded.

4.

The TPL decompresses the compressed PalmOS image held in the non-volatile memory and loads the
decompressed PalmOS image into SDRAM passing control to it once loaded.

5.

The NVFS partition will be available to install applications and data.

6.

Any PalmOS function, or application loaded into the NVFS partition or on an SD/SDIO card, will be
available for selection and execution.

7.

When an application is selected, PalmOS loads the application (and its respective data) from its source
location (either the NVFS or an SD/SDIO card) into the SDRAM DBCache and executes it.

8.

PalmOS remains active until either power is lost or until a soft reset or system reset occurs.

Upon a soft reset/system reset the following will occur:
1.

The NVFS partition will remain unchanged, but the SDRAM will be cleared.

2.

Events 2 to 4 above are performed.

3. Events 6 to 8 above apply.
Upon entering and resuming from sleep mode:
1.

No clearing of NVFS partition or SDRAM occurs.

2.

In sleep mode certain devices are switched off (e.g. LCD screen) to reduce power consumption.

Upon SDIO card/device insertion:
1.

Power is supplied to the device and it is initialised.

2.

The CSA is mounted, if the device is a combo device the file system on the flash memory is also
mounted.

3.

Code in the CSA is downloaded and executed.

CHALLENGES IN ACHIEVING THE SDV DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR A
SMARTPHONE SDV
The overview of the memory capabilities & management, file systems and SDIO card management has
highlighted that the Treo 650 with PalmOS 5.4.8 works differently to a laptop PC and its respective HDD.
Designing a Smartphone SDV that meets the six security design principles will therefore be difficult and need to
consider the following:
Treo & PalmOS are Closed Technologies: Whilst Palm and Access Co Ltd (a co-developer of PalmOS 5) do
publish good documentation and APIs for PalmOS 5 (which is more significantly informative than
documentation available from other proprietary Smartphone operating system vendors e.g. Microsoft and
Symbian) detailed descriptions of PalmOS internals appear only to be available to strategic partners. No
information appears to be published on the Treo hardware design. Lack of comprehensive hardware and
operating system documentation presents a considerable challenge to implementing the six security design
principles for a Smartphone SDV.
Different Modus Operandi: When a laptop is to be used it is turned on and the operating system is booted, work
is performed and when finished the laptop operating system is shutdown. A Treo 650, however, is effectively
always on; there is an on/off mode but this mode puts the Treo 650 to sleep to conserve power. Provided the
battery has sufficient charge and a reset is not performed, the PalmOS image and executing applications (and
data) remain active in the SDRAM even when the Treo is ‘sleeping’. This different mode of operation (between
Smartphone and PC) will make the pre-boot authentication design principle difficult to achieve.
Different Storage Technologies: A PC’s HDD is separated from the PC motherboard and accessed through the
IDE bus, hence the SDV is able to be located on the IDE bus between the PC and HDD. Whilst the internal bus
structure of the Treo 650 is not known5 it is highly likely that the NAND Flash and the SDRAM are closely
coupled (i.e. physically connected circuitry). Interposing SDV technology (as it is currently conceived) to
5
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control the data channel, between the two memories via an SDIO card would be impossible. Therefore, it
follows that fully encrypting the non-volatile NAND Flash (Disk On A Chip) memory it not possible as the boot
start point could not be moved to an SDIO device. As a result performing full disk encryption and controlling
the data channel, as per the SDV design, would not be possible for internal Treo storage.
NVFS Partition is not Fully at Rest: An important difference between the Treo 650 and a PC is that data in the
NVFS partition (the equivalent of an internal HDD in a Treo) can never be considered to be at rest. As outlined
above, PalmOS optimises storage by moving data and filling partially filled sectors in the NVFS partition. This
method of storage optimisation may potentially make sector level encryption difficult to achieve, e.g. if a sector
is encrypted by a Smartphone SDV (assuming it is possible to implement some form of internal sector level
encryption beneath PalmOS) following a write request to the NVFS partition and then subsequently the PalmOS
NVFS manager performs storage optimisation and changes the contents of the sector, then when the sector is reread it will not decrypt correctly due to the changed contents of the sector.
PalmOS & Storage Are Highly Integrated: PalmOS provides a rich set of functionality to manage memory, file
systems and devices in a compact and efficient package. Developing a Smartphone SDV that is totally
independent of the operating system and implementing security functionality in hardware would require a large
amount of functionality to be built to emulate some of the capabilities of expansion card manager, SDIO slot
manager, VFS manager and NVFS manager.

POSSIBLE SMARTPHONE SDV DESIGN OPTIONS
Packaging a Smartphone SDV as an SDIO Device
Implementing a Smartphone SDV as an SDIO card/device provides a logical way of retrofitting SDV
technology into a Treo 650. It is envisaged that a Smartphone SDV would be packaged into a “block” on the
end of an SDIO card which protrudes out of the top of Treo 650 SDIO slot. Figure 7 presents a possible
example of how a Smartphone SDV may be packaged.

Figure 7 – Possible SDIO Smartphone SDV Packaging 6
On a Treo 650 the SDIO slot is located on the top of the phone (see Figure 8). It is envisaged that the SDIO
Smartphone SDV protruding “block” would be approximately the same height and width as the Treo 650
external aerial (see figure 3 for frontal image of Treo 650 with external aerial). The size of the protruding
“block” would, however, vary depending upon the amount of functionality and supporting circuitry required.

Figure 8 – Top down view of SD/SDIO slot on Treo 650 7
6
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Qualifications to Designs
The proposed SDV Smartphone design options are conceptual; no qualification has been performed to confirm
the:
•

Treo 650 can supply sufficient power to the SDIO packaged Smartphone SDV circuitry.

•

Required Integrated Circuits (ICs) and supporting circuitry can be packaged into an acceptable size
SDIO “block”.

•

Cost to build. Neither the development nor manufacturing costs have been estimated to qualify if any
of the options are commercially feasible.

•

Market demand. No detailed market research has been performed to ascertain if a viable market exists
for a Smartphone SDV. A few existing customers indicating interest would not be sufficient to
commence development.

•

Host Smartphones. The Treo 650 with PalmOS was selected for this research because it is a tried and
tested product with good documentation available. However, if a Smartphone SDV was to proceed it
would need to be a product that could work with the broadest range of Smartphones and operating
systems.
Infeasible Functionality
A number of challenges have been identified with respect to designing a Smartphone SDV that is conformant
with the SDV security design principles. Developing functionality for a Smartphone SDV for a Treo 650 with
PalmOS 5 would appear to be infeasible for the following areas:
•

Hardware based encryption of the NVFS partition

•

Sector level encryption of the NVFS partition

•

Control of the data between SDRAM and the NVFS partition

•

Full disk encryption of the internal “Disk on Chip” non volatile NAND Flash storage.

Option 1 – A Full ‘SDV like’ Implementation
This conceptual design is the most conformant to the six SDV security design principles. It would also be the
most difficult to implement – it may, after further investigation, prove infeasible to implement. In this option the
proposed core functionality will include:
•

Pre-boot authentication.

•

Access to data on external flash only possible after successful authentication.

•

Hardware based encryption of the external flash memory.

•

Sector level encryption of the external flash memory.

•

Software based encryption of NVFS partition.

Pre-boot authentication would be achieved by replacing the standard SPL with a ‘secure SPL’ that interfaces
with the inserted (SDIO) Smartphone SDV to download an authentication application. Upon successful
authentication the SPL loads the standard TPL and the standard PalmOS boot process resumes. Access to data
on the external flash memory and the CSA is blocked until successful authentication.
Hardware based, sector level encryption of the external flash memory would be performed on the fly by the
crypto capabilities of the Smartphone SDV and would be separate and transparent to the Treo and PalmOS.
Encryption key generation will be based on authentication credentials.
Software encryption of the NVFS partition would be achieved by downloading an application from the inserted
Smartphone SDV (SDIO) CSA.
It is proposed a Smartphone SDV would mimic the SDV hardware architecture. Figure 9 presents a model of
the SDV hardware architecture.

Figure 9 – Model of Key Components and Interfaces in SDV
In a Smartphone SDV the:
•

Host PC physical bus interface will be an SDIO slot physical interface.

•

Host interface logic will be the SDIO interface logic.

•

Device interface logic will be the interface logic to flash memory.

The logic components could be packaged into a single application specific IC or a number of ICs each
implementing one or more of the specialist functions.
The SDIO interface logic will work in both a pre-boot and post-boot mode. In pre-boot mode the ‘secure SPL’
will need to communicate with the Smartphone SDV through SDIO logic to enable the authentication
application to be downloaded. In post-boot mode the SDIO logic interface will operate as standard SDIO card.
PalmOS will identify the SDIO device and mount the CSA and file system on the flash memory. When the CSA
is mounted the SDIO capability to automatically download an application in the CSA will be used to load an
NVFS encryption application; it is envisaged that this application will operate in a similar manner to existing
software encryption applications (Teallock 2007) that are available, i.e. particular applications and data held in
the NVFS partition are selected for encryption with actual encryption taking place once the Treo goes into sleep
mode, with decryption occurring once the Treo is woken up.
Data will be written/read to/from the external SDIO flash memory using the VFS manager but as each sector is
written/read to/from memory the Smartphone SDV will encrypt/decrypt each sector on the fly unbeknown to the
Treo. The hardware and software crypto systems will adopt different key generation and management strategies
to ensure that if the weaker software encryption is broken the stronger hardware encryption is not immediately
vulnerable.
The downloaded encryption application will include an authentication function that will be activated when the
Treo goes into sleep mode. This authentication function will communicate with Smartphone SDV to perform
authentication. Only successfully authentication will allow the Treo to exit sleep mode.
Concept of operation
As the NVFS software based encryption will be weaker than the hardware based external flash memory security
it would be expected that a user of a Treo will move as many applications and as much data as possible to the
external flash memory in the Smartphone SDV.
Insert SDIO Smartphone SDV and immediately perform a soft reset - the following set of events will occur:
1.

The IPL loads the Smartphone SDV ‘secure SPL’.

2.

If the ‘secure SPL’ does not detect a correctly inserted Smartphone SDV (N.B. for occasions when a
soft reset is performed without Smartphone SDV being inserted) the secure SPL behaves like a normal
SPL, otherwise the ‘secure SPL’ will supply power to the Smartphone SDV and load an authentication
application from the Smartphone SDV, passing control to the authentication application.

3.

The authentication application requests the authentication credentials from the user and passes them to
the Smartphone SDV for authentication. If correct authentication occurs the TPL loads and control
passes to the TPL; upon correct authentication the Smartphone will have correctly generated the
encryption keys for both hardware and software based crypto systems.

4.

The TPL decompresses and loads the PalmOS image into SDRAM and passes control to PalmOS

5.

PalmOS will detect the Smartphone SDV and mount both the CSA and external flash memory file
system. The NVFS encryption application will be downloaded from the CSA and commence
execution.

6.

Whenever data is written to the external flash memory it will be encrypted, likewise for selected NVFS
based applications the respective data will be encrypted when written from SDRAM.

Possible Implementation Issues
Theoretically this design option can be implemented. A lot of information is available (Treo Web Sites 2007) on
how “customised ROMs” (customised boot loader and PalmOS) and Linux implementations have been installed
into a Treo 650, therefore changing the boot loader to include a ‘secure SPL’ is entirely feasible. However, the
following implementation questions arise:
Is performing a soft/system reset user friendly? On a Treo a soft reset requires the battery to be removed and
then re-inserted, whilst a system reset requires the reset button positioned under the battery cover to be pushed
while pressing the up arrow on the keyboard. Neither reset option is particular elegant to perform.
Can a concise ‘secure SPL’ be developed that can detect, power and communicate with an SDIO device? It has
been shown that SDIO device management requires comprehensive PalmOS libraries, implementing the
necessary software to enable communication with an SDIO device and downloading an authentication
application will be challenging.
Can a concise authentication application be developed with the drivers required to accept input from the
keyboard and display output on the LCD? As authentication is performed pre-boot none of the PalmOS
input/output drivers will be available.
Will performance of external flash based applications be acceptable? As ‘SDV like’ strong security can only be
provided on external memory all, data and applications requiring protection should be located to the external
flash memory. Loading from flash is noticeably slower than loading from the NVFS partition. Coupled with
‘on-the-fly’ encryption, performance may become a barrier to use.
Can the Smartphone SDV be removed while the software encryption application is resident in PalmOS SDRAM
without corrupting the NVFS partition? Either the software encryption application will need to detect if the
Smartphone SDV has been removed and then perform an orderly closure, or the encryption application is
developed so that it can remain a resident application, independent of the Smartphone SDV, to provide on-going
protection for applications and data held in the NVFS partition.
Will the Flash Translation Layer (FTL) prevent sector level encryption? The FTL allows NAND flash to be
addressed as logical 512 byte sectors and ensures flash ‘bad blocks’ and ‘worn out’ blocks are not used. Figure
10 shows how FTL is positioned in the flash memory addressing scheme. The FTL manages the flash while
providing a simple logical sector interface to the host system. It is possible that the FTL changes the location of
data (FTL discussion 2007) as part of FTL management, i.e. as blocks become bad or worn data is moved; such
movement of data may cause major problems for sector level encryption.

Figure 10 – Position of FTL in Flashing Memory Addressing Scheme
Conformance to SDV Design Principles
•

Pre-boot authentication: Theoretically met.

•

Full disk encryption: Partially met, external flash memory will be fully encrypted but internal flash will
not.

•

Sector level encryption: Partially met, external flash memory will use sector level encryption but the
NVFS partition will use file encryption.

•

Control of data channel: Partially, SDV technology will be positioned between the Smartphone and
external flash memory. Not possible for internal memory.

•

Totally independent of PC Operating System: Partially, external based flash memory security will be
independent of the operating system. However, the NVFS encryption application would utilise
PalmOS capabilities.

•

Security functionality implemented in hardware: Partially, the external flash memory encryption will be
implemented in hardware; software encryption will encrypt data in internal memory.

Option 2 - Secure Authentication and Software Encryption
In this design option the proposed functionality will include:
•

Pre-boot authentication.

•

Access to data on external flash only possible after successful authentication.

•

Software based encryption of external flash memory located in Smartphone SDV.

•

Software based encryption of NVFS partition.

Pre-boot authentication is implemented as described in option1 with access to data on the external flash memory
and the CSA blocked until successful authentication.
Software encryption of the external flash memory and the NVFS partition would be achieved by downloading
an application from the inserted Smartphone SDV (SDIO) CSA.
A simpler hardware architecture is required consisting of:
•

SDIO interface logic.

•

A simple (secure) microcontroller to process authentication credentials and perform key generation and
management.

The PalmOS SDIO management capabilities will write encrypted data to the external flash memory via the
encryption application running on the Treo. No complex encryption hardware is required.
The rationale for developing this option is to provide a secure separate storage device protected by strong preboot authentication. Whilst this option will not be as secure as option 1, it will be less complex to develop.
Concept of Operation
Insert SDIO Smartphone SDV and immediately perform a soft reset - the following set of events will occur:
1.

Events 1 to 4 in option 1 are performed.

2.

PalmOS will detect the Smartphone SDV and mount both the CSA and external flash memory file
system. The encryption application for both the internal (NVFS partition) and external flash memory
will be downloaded from the CSA and commence execution.

3.

Whenever data is written to the external flash memory it will be encrypted, likewise for selected NVFS
based applications the respective data will be encrypted when written from SDRAM.

Possible Implementation Issues
With the exception of pre-boot authentication, this option will be considerably less complex to implement. The
option 1 useability and pre-boot authentication implementation issues exist, and due to software encryption of
the external flash memory performance is like to be worse than option 1.
To avoid potentially corrupting both the internal and external flash memory either the software encryption
application will need to detect if the Smartphone SDV has been removed and then perform an orderly closure, or
the encryption application is developed so that it can remain a resident application, independent of the
Smartphone SDV, to provide on-going protection for applications and data held in the NVFS partition.
Conformance to SDV Design Principles
•

Pre-boot authentication: Theoretically met.

•

Full disk encryption: Partially met, external flash memory would be fully encrypted, albeit using
software encryption.

•

Sector level encryption: No.

•

Control of data channel: No.

•

Totally independent of PC Operating System: Partially, pre-boot authentication will be performed
before the operating system is loaded.

•

Security functionality implemented in hardware: No.

Option 3 – Secure External Storage
This design option is the least conformant to the SDV security design principles. It will be a simple SDIO
device providing:
•

Post-boot authentication.

•

Access to data on external flash only possible after successful authentication.

•

Software based encryption of external flash memory located in Smartphone SDV.

•

Software based encryption of NVFS partition.

No soft/system reset will be required as the Smartphone SDV will be inserted into a booted Treo. The
Smartphone will operate like a standard SDIO device, i.e. upon insertion into the SDIO slot the Smartphone
SDV will be powered and notify PalmOS of its existence, the CSA in the Smartphone SDV will be mounted and
the encryption application downloaded. In this option the Smartphone SDV relies upon the PalmOS SDIO
management libraries.
This option offers comparatively little advantage over currently available software encryption applications and
an SD card. The major difference is that access to the Smartphone SDV external flash memory is blocked until
authentication is complete.
Concept of Operation
Insert Smartphone SDV into the SDIO slot of a full powered and running Treo 650 – the following events will
occur:
1.

Power is supplied to the Smartphone SDV and it is initialised.

2.

The Smartphone SDV CSA is mounted together with the file system on the Smartphone SDV flash
memory.

3.

An authentication application is downloaded from the Smartphone SDV CSA.

4.

The user will be prompted to enter authentication credentials.

5.

If authentication is successful, the software encryption application in the CSA is downloaded and
executed. No access to the external flash memory will be allowed until successful authentication.

6.

Whenever data is written to the external flash memory it will be encrypted, likewise for selected NVFS
based applications the respective data will be encrypted when written from SDRAM.

Possible Implementation Issues
There should be relatively few implementation issues. Standard SDIO hardware can be used, no specialist ICs
or microcontroller will be required. The implementation issues with respect to the software encryption
application identified in option 2 apply to this option.
Conformance to SDV Design Principles
•

Pre-boot authentication: No.

•

Full disk encryption: Partially, external flash memory would be fully encrypted, albeit using software
encryption.

•

Sector level encryption: No.

•

Control of data channel: No.

•

Totally independent of PC Operating System: No.

•

Security functionality implemented in hardware: No.

CONCLUSION
A comprehensive review of the hardware and software architecture of a sophisticated Smartphone has been
performed to identify if SDV technology can be integrated into a Smartphone to make it more secure and restrict
the opportunity for acquire data and perform forensic analysis. Three conceptual design options have been
presented and assessed against SDV security design principles with varying degrees of compliance.
So, can SDV technology be utilised in a Smartphone to prevent forensic analysis? There is no clear yes or no
answer. It has been shown not all of the SDV security features, as currently conceived, can be integrated into a
Smartphone, e.g. control of the data channel and sector level encryption for internal storage. However, some
SDV functions can be integrated into a Smartphone SDV that would strengthen security and virtually eliminate
the opportunity to acquire meaningful data for forensic analysis.
If the Smartphone SDV is captured in an authenticated state (whilst in a Treo) then the opportunity exists to
acquire sensitive data. If however, sensitive data and applications are held in the Smartphone SDV external flash
memory and the Smartphone SDV is removed from the SDIO slot when it is not in use, acquiring sensitive data
can be prevented.
Future work is planned to both consider other options for a Smartphone SDV and develop a proof of concept
Smartphone SDV based on the approach proposed in this paper.
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